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# Last Week in Identity: The vendor you stopped using still had a key
- URL: https://www.iamkev.io/last-week-in-identity-2026-w46/
- Published: 2026-11-16T08:22:43.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-16T08:22:43.000Z
- Description: An attacker walked through dormant Qubole trust roles into customer AWS accounts. Plus MSP Process, Patch Tuesday, SSHole and IBM buying AuthMind.
- Author: Kev Johnson
- Tags: Last Week in Identity, Non-Human Identity, Cloud IAM, Third-party Risk, Identity Resilience

Somewhere in a lot of AWS accounts there is a role that was created for a data platform called Qubole. Most of them had not been used since the spring. In October, someone used them anyway. Every single request carried the correct External ID, the little shared string a vendor presents to prove it's calling about the right customer, and every single request worked. Researchers at Sentra say it took about a second per role. The house rules were followed perfectly. They just weren't the right rules.

This week: how a vendor's trust relationship became the front door, why the identities that hurt you are often the ones you forgot, a quick-fire round with an MSP software firm, a Kerberos bug scored 9.8, an SSH flaw that rewards very long passwords, and IBM buying an identity company. Then the identity of the week, and what I'd do before Friday.

Not this week: last Thursday/Friday's M365 outage. Plenty of commentary on that elsewhere, but know that I was sending hugs to the folks at Microsoft who worked that particular recovery.

## The headlines

**MSP Process: the scope got bigger.** The MSP software firm first warned partners on 7 November that an attacker had read a storage account holding its Entra app client secrets, admin refresh tokens and GDAP relationship data. During this week the picture widened. A Huntress staffer, quoted by [The Stack](https://www.thestack.technology/msp-software-firm-hacked-with-customer-entra-environments-now-getting-pwned/?ref=iamkev.io), reported malicious token grants in 47 tenants, with one tenant seeing significant hands-on activity, including accounts that responders had disabled being switched back on. [Field Effect](https://fieldeffect.com/blog/msp-process-incident?ref=iamkev.io) reported on 11 November that the actor also reached infrastructure for MSP Process's Microsoft Partner Center integrations, and that the company has disabled password reset, MFA reset, user unlock and authenticator verification. The CEO told The Stack the breach was "contained" and that Sophos is leading the response. [Inforcer](https://www.inforcer.com/insights/when-a-gdap-vendor-is-breached-check-your-own-tenant?ref=iamkev.io) has a sensible checklist, and the reminder that Entra ID Free keeps sign-in logs for only seven days. That clock has now run out for the first day of activity.

**Patch Tuesday brought two 9.8s to the directory.** Microsoft's November release covered roughly 1,090 CVEs, according to the [Zero Day Initiative](https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/11/10/the-november-2026-security-update-review?ref=iamkev.io). The one exploited in the wild is an Outlook spoofing bug, CVE-2026-124194, where opening a crafted file makes classic Outlook leak the user's NTLMv2 hash. The identity headliners are a Windows LDAP remote code execution flaw (CVE-2026-119958) and a Kerberos elevation of privilege flaw (CVE-2026-85844), both CVSS 9.8, both rated "Exploitation Less Likely" by Microsoft, per [Rapid7](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026/?ref=iamkev.io). "Less likely" is not a maintenance window. Your domain controllers are the patch, not the afterthought.

**SSHole is now exploited, officially.** CISA added the OpenSSH authentication bypass CVE-2026-123158 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 9 November, with a federal deadline of 12 November, per [eSecurity Planet](https://www.esecurityplanet.com/vulnerabilities/news-cisa-kev-gpustack-freeswitch-openssh-ibm-november-2026/?ref=iamkev.io). [Greenbone](https://www.greenbone.net/en/blog/openssh-authentication-bypass-alpine-cve-2026-123158/?ref=iamkev.io) explains the conditions: musl libc without PAM (think Alpine), password authentication left on, and an account with `*` in its password field. Then any password between 257 and 1,024 bytes gets you in. For years we've told people longer passwords are better. This was not what we meant.

**IBM buys AuthMind.** IBM said on 12 November it has [acquired AuthMind](https://newsroom.ibm.com/blog-ibm-advances-agent-identity-security-with-new-vault-capabilities?ref=iamkev.io), which watches how human, machine and AI agent identities actually use their access, and will build it into HashiCorp Vault. Terms weren't disclosed. [ID Tech](https://idtechwire.com/ibm-acquires-authmind-to-watch-how-ai-agents-use-their-credentials/?ref=iamkev.io) notes IBM Ventures backed AuthMind's seed round in 2023\. The logic: Vault hands out the credential, AuthMind tells you what happened after. The so what: if you run AuthMind today, IBM hasn't yet said anything about pricing, timelines or standalone support, so... ask.

![26: Qubole findings published, SSHole added to CISA KEV and MSP Process tenant count reported on Monday; Patch Tuesday with Kerberos and LDAP 9.8 flaws on Tuesday; MSP Process Partner Center scope reported on Wednesday; IBM confirms AuthMind on Thursday; early MSP Process sign-in logs expiring on Entra ID Free by Saturday.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/c0/c2/c0c21edb-3a9c-48a0-9633-b78a9738d43c/content/images/2026/11/last-week-in-identity-2026-w46-fig1-light.png)

## The main story: Qubole and the trust nobody switched off

Here is what happened, as reported by [Wiz](https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild?ref=iamkev.io) and [Sentra](https://sentra.io/blog/breaches/inside-the-qubole-supply-chain-attack?ref=iamkev.io), who investigated alongside Mandiant. Both published on 9 November.

When you connect a SaaS platform to your AWS account, the standard pattern is a cross-account role. You create a role in your account whose trust policy says "the vendor's AWS account may assume this", usually with a condition that the caller must present a specific External ID. The vendor calls `sts:AssumeRole`, gets short-lived credentials, and does its job. It's the AWS-recommended way to do it, and it beats handing a vendor long-lived access keys.

Between 14 and 26 October, someone used IAM credentials belonging to Qubole's own AWS account to call `AssumeRole` against those customer roles. Wiz says every request it attributed to the attacker included an External ID, and every one succeeded. In most affected environments, those were the only `AssumeRole` calls from Qubole's account all month. Sentra says the roles had gone dormant in the spring. The integrations had stopped. The trust had not.

Once inside, the attacker did what you'd do if you were tidy and in a hurry. They enumerated storage, compute, databases and IAM. Then they went for the places secrets live: Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store. Sentra says about 100 passwords and keys were read in seven minutes. The attacker then ran the open-source tool TruffleHog to test what they'd found: AWS keys, Microsoft Entra ID service principal secrets and Okta OAuth client credentials. Finally, they downloaded data from S3, in some sessions whole buckets. Sentra's logs from one company showed millions of files taken. Wiz saw no write operations at all. Nothing was changed or deleted. It was a very polite burglary.

![Flow diagram of the Qubole attack: credentials from Qubole's AWS account, AssumeRole into dormant customer roles with a valid External ID, harvesting Lambda variables, Secrets Manager and SSM, validating AWS, Entra and Okta credentials with TruffleHog, and bulk S3 downloads, with a note that a source IP condition would have blocked every assumption. ](https://storage.ghost.io/c/c0/c2/c0c21edb-3a9c-48a0-9633-b78a9738d43c/content/images/2026/11/last-week-in-identity-2026-w46-fig2-light.png)

### What's confirmed and what isn't

Confirmed by the researchers: the role assumptions, the harvesting, the credential testing and the S3 downloads, all from a rented OVH server and Mullvad VPN addresses. Also confirmed: no AWS vulnerability was involved.

Not known: how the attacker got Qubole's credentials. The [Cloud Security Alliance](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-qubole-cross-account-role-abuse-20261110-c/?ref=iamkev.io) suggests the most plausible route is access to Qubole's own systems, where External IDs sit next to each customer's role ARN, but calls that an inference. [The Hacker News](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html?ref=iamkev.io) and the CSA both found no public statement from Qubole. Victim numbers are fuzzy: Sentra says more than a dozen organisations in one place and dozens of customers in another. Wiz's 11 November update notes that an actor calling itself "n0n" has claimed responsibility, which Wiz has not verified. And Wiz found a bootable Linux image called `sso_agent.iso` on the attacker's server that phones home for commands and then hard reboots after 90 minutes, which would wipe the evidence. Wiz hasn't seen it deployed anywhere. To me, that's a curiosity, not a finding, but one that's worth noting.

### Why it worked

The External ID did exactly what it was designed to do, which is not much. It exists to stop the "confused deputy" problem, where a vendor is tricked into acting on the wrong customer's role. It was never meant to be a secret that protects you from the vendor's own account being misused. Wiz points out that it's logged in plain text in CloudTrail. If the caller is the vendor's own account, the External ID is something it already knows. It's a doorman checking the guest list, when the problem is who's holding the guest list.

What would have stopped it was boring. Wiz says a source IP condition on the trust policy alone would have blocked every role assumption it observed. Removing the vendor from roles that hadn't been used since spring would have done the same. Neither is clever. Both require someone to own the integration after the project that created it has finished.

I say this as someone who has, more than once, created a role "just for the trial" and moved on to the next shiny thing. There's always another fire to put out, and it can be easy to simply forget. After all, nobody runs a leaving do for a dormant integration.

### The bigger pattern

Put this next to MSP Process from the quick-fire round and the shape is the same. A vendor holds a credential that acts as you, in your environment, without a person and without MFA. The vendor is breached or its credential leaks. Your controls, which were built around people signing in, see a trusted application doing what trusted applications do.

The part that should worry identity people most is the second hop. The attacker came in through AWS IAM and left with Entra service principal secrets and Okta OAuth client credentials. Your cloud provider's secret stores are also, quietly, a copy of your identity provider's non-human credentials. A breach that starts as "someone read some S3 buckets" can end as "someone can sign in to Entra as your workloads", which is the story I covered last week from a slightly different direction.

![Comparison table of Qubole and MSP Process: what was trusted, what the attacker held, whether MFA applied, what was reached, and status. Both were vendor-held non-human credentials, MFA did not apply to either, and both are confirmed incidents with the initial access route not public. ](https://storage.ghost.io/c/c0/c2/c0c21edb-3a9c-48a0-9633-b78a9738d43c/content/images/2026/11/last-week-in-identity-2026-w46-fig3-light.png)

### What defenders should do

Start with an inventory. Find every IAM role whose trust policy allows an external account, and for each one ask who owns it and when it was last used. Delete the dormant ones. For the ones you keep, replace the vendor's `:root` with its specific principal, and add an `aws:SourceIp` or `aws:SourceVpce` condition using the vendor's published ranges. If the vendor won't publish ranges, that tells you something.

Next, shrink what a vendor role can read. A data platform rarely needs `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue` across the account, or Lambda configuration. Then fix your eyes: CloudTrail management events show the role assumption and the bucket listing but not the object reads, so turn on S3 data events or server access logs for buckets that matter.

If you had Qubole trust in place, Wiz suggests reviewing CloudTrail from 1 October. Rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda variable those roles could read, and revoke active role sessions, because rotating a credential does not end a session that has already been issued.

### The recovery question

Could you detect it? Only if you were watching `AssumeRole` calls from a vendor coming from addresses that vendor had never used, and only if your logging covered object reads. Many accounts had neither.

Could you contain it? Removing the trust is quick. The harder bit is the second hop: every Entra service principal secret and Okta client credential that sat in those stores is now suspect. You need to know which identities had secrets stored where, rotate them, and then check what those identities did while the attacker held them.

Could you roll back to known-good? This is where non-human identity recovery is still immature. For human accounts, most of us at least know what "good" looks like. For app registrations and service principals, ask yourself: do you have a record of which credentials each one had on 13 October, which permissions, and which owners? MSP Process showed what happens when you don't. Attackers planted secrets across dozens of apps in one tenant and switched disabled accounts back on. If you can't compare today's state with a known-good snapshot, you're not recovering, you're guessing.

The lesson isn't "don't trust vendors". You have to trust vendors. It's that trust is an identity, it has a lifecycle, and the end of a project is not the end of that lifecycle unless somebody makes it so.

## Identity of the week

![Illustrative ID badge for the identity of the week, a dormant Qubole integration role, alongside this week's charge sheet: Qubole roles abused (main story, confirmed attack), MSP Process scope widens (confirmed breach), Kerberos and LDAP 9.8s patched (vulnerability), SSHole exploited and on KEV (vulnerability), and IBM buys AuthMind (deal). The badge and role name are illustrative.](https://storage.ghost.io/c/c0/c2/c0c21edb-3a9c-48a0-9633-b78a9738d43c/content/images/2026/11/last-week-in-identity-2026-w46-badge-light.png)

Name: a cross-account IAM role created for Qubole. The name on the badge is illustrative; yours will have its own.

Vouched for by: a trust policy naming Qubole's AWS account, plus an External ID. Last legitimate use, according to Sentra: sometime in the spring. Clearance: whatever was granted when the integration was set up, which in the cases investigated included reading Lambda configuration, Secrets Manager, Parameter Store and S3\. Expiry date: none. Trust policies don't expire. They just wait.

What went wrong: nothing, technically. It recognised the right account, checked the right External ID and opened the door, every time, for twelve days. It is the most obedient identity in your estate, and that is the problem.

## What I'd do this week

1. **List every external trust.** In AWS, find roles that trust another account. In Entra, list multi-tenant enterprise apps with application permissions, and note which partner apps hold `Application.ReadWrite.All` or `AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All`. Give each one an owner or delete it.
2. **Pin vendor roles to the vendor's network.** Add source IP or VPC endpoint conditions to cross-account trust policies, and ask vendors for their egress ranges in writing.
3. **Patch your domain controllers for the November Kerberos and LDAP flaws,** and close the Outlook NTLM hash leak by checking SMB and LDAP signing and Extended Protection on AD CS and Exchange.
4. **Find your Alpine boxes.** Check container images and appliances for sshd without PAM and with password authentication on, and update the `openssh` package. A version banner won't tell you, because Alpine backported the fix.
5. **Turn on the logs you'll want later:** S3 data events for sensitive buckets, Microsoft Graph activity logs in Entra, and longer sign-in retention than seven days.
6. **Take a known-good snapshot of your app registrations and service principals** (credentials, permissions, owners) so that next time you can compare rather than guess.

Here's my question for you: when did you last remove a vendor's access because the project ended, rather than because something went wrong? Hit reply or find me on LinkedIn. And if this was useful, subscribe, and it'll land in your inbox every Monday.

That's last week in identity. Check your app consents, and I'll see you next Monday.

## Sources

**Qubole cross-account role abuse**

- [Qubole cross-account access abused in the wild](https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild?ref=iamkev.io), Wiz, 9 November 2026 (updated 11 November)
- [Inside the Qubole supply chain attack](https://sentra.io/blog/breaches/inside-the-qubole-supply-chain-attack?ref=iamkev.io), Sentra, 9 November 2026
- [Hackers exploit Qubole's trusted AWS access to breach customer accounts](https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html?ref=iamkev.io), The Hacker News, 9 November 2026
- [Qubole supply chain attack exposed AWS, Entra ID, and Okta credentials](https://www.csoonline.com/article/4246780/qubole-supply-chain-attack-exposed-aws-entra-id-and-okta-credentials.html?ref=iamkev.io), CSO Online, 10 November 2026
- [Trusted by default: Qubole cross-account role abuse](https://labs.cloudsecurityalliance.org/research/csa-research-note-qubole-cross-account-role-abuse-20261110-c/?ref=iamkev.io), Cloud Security Alliance, 10 November 2026

**MSP Process**

- [MSP software firm hacked, with customer Entra environments now getting pwned](https://www.thestack.technology/msp-software-firm-hacked-with-customer-entra-environments-now-getting-pwned/?ref=iamkev.io), The Stack, 9 November 2026
- [When a GDAP vendor is breached, check your own tenant](https://www.inforcer.com/insights/when-a-gdap-vendor-is-breached-check-your-own-tenant?ref=iamkev.io), Inforcer, 9 November 2026
- [MSP Process security incident creates customer tenant risk](https://fieldeffect.com/blog/msp-process-incident?ref=iamkev.io), Field Effect, 11 November 2026

**November Patch Tuesday**

- [The November 2026 security update review](https://www.thezdi.com/blog/2026/11/10/the-november-2026-security-update-review?ref=iamkev.io), Zero Day Initiative, 10 November 2026
- [Patch Tuesday, November 2026](https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/em-patch-tuesday-november-2026/?ref=iamkev.io), Rapid7, 10 November 2026 (updated 12 November)

**SSHole (CVE-2026-123158)**

- [CISA adds 4 exploited flaws to KEV](https://www.esecurityplanet.com/vulnerabilities/news-cisa-kev-gpustack-freeswitch-openssh-ibm-november-2026/?ref=iamkev.io), eSecurity Planet, 10 November 2026
- [OpenSSH authentication bypass on Alpine](https://www.greenbone.net/en/blog/openssh-authentication-bypass-alpine-cve-2026-123158/?ref=iamkev.io), Greenbone, 12 November 2026

**IBM and AuthMind**

- [IBM advances agent identity security with new Vault capabilities](https://newsroom.ibm.com/blog-ibm-advances-agent-identity-security-with-new-vault-capabilities?ref=iamkev.io), IBM Newsroom, 12 November 2026
- [IBM acquires AuthMind to watch how AI agents use their credentials](https://idtechwire.com/ibm-acquires-authmind-to-watch-how-ai-agents-use-their-credentials/?ref=iamkev.io), ID Tech, 12 November 2026

Feature image: Photo by [Fellipe Ditadi](https://unsplash.com/@ditadi?ref=iamkev.io) on [Unsplash](https://unsplash.com/photos/bright-blue-double-doors-set-in-a-white-wall-V1pIysdEBZw?ref=iamkev.io)